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Spying on friends: British assessments of French security, 1945-50 
 
With the leaky state of France, the Russians probably already have all 
the information they want. 
– Ernest Bevin, UK Foreign Secretary, to Prime Minister Clement       
Attlee, 13 July, 1950.1 
 
Abstract 
The emergence of intelligence studies as a distinctive branch of international history has 
provided many new insights into the nature of international affairs during the past thirty years. 
Certain aspects of intelligence, however, remain largely overlooked. One such area, which is 
the focus of this article, is that of bureaucratic security; that being, how a state ensures the 
security of the information that it holds and how they disseminate this information throughout 
its bureaucracies and with its allies. Whilst this may appear as a mundane avenue for 
investigation, this piece demonstrates that bureaucratic security issues had an impact on ‘high 
level’ political decisions during the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), adversely affected relations between the United Kingdom and France, and created 
additional problems surrounding the emergence of an integrated military framework within 
the NATO alliance. 
Keywords: Attlee, Ernest Bevin, intelligence sharing, bureaucratic politics, Anglo-French 
relations; JIC; MI6; SIS; MI5; NATO. 
Introduction 
NATO was unique in that, unlike previous peacetime alliances, it developed integrated 
military machinery to prepare against an attack from the Soviet Union that its founders 
considered likely. Joint command structures, cooperative planning, and defence procurement 
were initiated in order to integrate the resources of the twelve founding members of NATO 
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into one cohesive military force for the defence of Western Europe. Given this then, the sine 
qua non of an alliance is the secure exchange of information, for without it no combined 
strategic or tactical planning can take place and therefore render the entire purpose of a 
military alliance redundant. This, however, brings with it a whole series of other problems as 
for any state that engages in military collaboration runs the risk that sensitive information can 
be leaked by their allies. In essence, internal security can be assured (to a certain degree) 
because the state can ensure it has the necessary security practices and procedures in place. 
When sharing sensitive information with another state, this cannot be as easily assured given 
that the state which is being provided with the information cannot be guaranteed to adhere to 
the same level of security practices which it employs. It is the case, therefore, that in 
information sharing, the weakest link determines the strength of the overall chain.2  
With this in mind, this paper is concerned with British perceptions of alliance security, the 
impact that military information sharing could have upon British interests, and the remedies 
which the British devised for overcoming such problems during the years when NATO was 
conceived and created, 1946-50. Central to our paper is what we term ‘bureaucratic security’. 
By this, we simply mean the procedures and processes that are created for the sharing of 
information, and the enforcement and control of these procedures. In relation to this paper, we 
specifically analyse how information relating to intelligence and military matters was shared 
within both the NATO and Anglo-French context and the types of bureaucratic security 
procedures that were created and implemented for achieving the aim of secure information 
exchanges.  
British assessments of France are at the forefront of this paper as is the discussion of the 
METRIC and COSMIC systems created at the behest of the British as a means of improving 
the alliances bureaucratic security. This area of research is something that is extremely under 
developed throughout the literature on the origins of NATO alliance, Anglo-French relations, 
and the broader discussions about the early Cold War period. For instance, all of the major 
works on the origins of the NATO alliance give scant regard to how military information 
sharing had a bearing upon the creation of the alliance.3 Likewise, the extensive literature 
about Anglo-French relations gives the subject little time. Usually, they treat information 
security as a sideshow – if at all – only mentioning the matter when security considerations 
prevented France from attending the top secret ‘Pentagon Talks’ in March 1948.4  Even works 
that look closely at the machinery of the security apparatus of the British state pay the subject 
scant attention.5  
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The apparent unimportance of bureaucratic security and the procedures put in place to 
improve it is perhaps best highlighted by the fact it receives no mention at all in the two 
recent official histories of the British intelligence services.6 Whilst Christopher Andrew 
devotes an entire chapter to ‘Vetting’ and ‘Protective Security’ in his official history of MI5, 
he does not mention the types of bureaucratic security measures that were enacted by the 
service to improve either British internal bureaucratic security or that of foreign powers.7 
Likewise, Richard Aldrich in his study of Britain’s signals intelligence agency, GCHQ, notes 
on several occasions how bureaucratic security procedures were deemed important by British 
elites, but then does not go on to explain how this impacted upon policy decisions or the types 
of procedures and structures that were created by the British to overcome these problems.8 
Perhaps one could legitimately argue that this subject has not received much attention because 
it was largely irrelevant in influencing events. This, however, would be an erroneous 
assessment. As shown in this paper, the seemingly mundane matter of information sharing 
with alliance partners had a bearing upon the degree and speed of military sharing at the 
beginning of the Cold War and the actual building-up of NATO as an effective military 
alliance. The fact should be recalled that the signing of the Atlantic Treaty (1949) did not 
immediately yield an effective war-alliance. Rather, it was only in 1952, some three years 
following the creation of the alliance, that NATO was actually ready to take over the defence 
work from the Western Union Defence Organisation (WUDO). As Don Cook has written, the 
April 1949 signing ceremony was ‘appropriate to the launching of a ship that now had to be 
towed away to a fitting-out yard to sit while builders and welders got to work to get it ready to 
put out to sea.’9 Given the fact that NATO was a military organisation which would naturally 
involve the exchange of information related to areas often deemed by policy-makers as the 
most sensitive and secretive aspects of the states security, it should not come as any great 
surprise that British policy-making elites were apprehensive about exchanging information 
within the framework of this new organisation. What then is a surprise is not the fact that this 
paper surveys this subject, but rather the lack of attention that it has received from other 
scholars.10  
Further to this, by chiefly utilising intelligence and defence files, we highlight that 
bureaucratic insecurity as perceived by British officials could, and did, have a bearing upon 
‘high level’ decisions made by the Attlee government (1945-51).11 With this in mind, this 
paper makes several arguments. The first of these is that bureaucratic security did play a role 
more important than hitherto considered by the existing literature. Specifically, fears about 
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French insecurity threatened to stall staff talks at a vital point in the creation of the NATO 
alliance. This is not to suggest that bureaucratic security issues would have prevented the 
creation of the integrated military mechanism within the NATO alliance. Rather, bureaucratic 
security concerns slowed down the creation of this and, perhaps more importantly, was an 
issue that had to be resolved before NATO could undertake the military cooperation that its 
founders intended. 
Along with this, two other main points are presented here. The first of these is that British 
concerns about bureaucratic insecurity were largely genuine and they were not designed as a 
ploy to prevent military sharing with the French, nor was it designed to ensure that the US-
UK ‘special relationship’ would remain exclusive.12 Rather, British concerns about French 
insecurity were based on specific and detailed intelligence reports, and were ‘real’ reactions to 
what they perceived were genuine security problems.  
Finally it is demonstrated that it was the British who were the driving force behind the 
creation of more sophisticated forms of bureaucratic security within the newly created NATO 
alliance. By pushing for bureaucratic security improvements, and by insisting that they 
actually be implemented, the British were reluctantly prepared to delay the establishment of 
military cooperation within the NATO alliance. This is not an insignificant point given the 
context of this period. It has to be remembered, of course, that even small delays were 
considered crucial at this point given the rising East-West tensions surrounding Berlin and the 
fact that the explosion of the Soviet Union’s first atomic weapon in August 1949 led to 
deepening concerns that war would break out. When the Korean War erupted in June 1950, 
something that had come as a complete shock to western intelligence services, there was a 
genuine fear that a global conflict with the Soviet bloc was imminent.13 Nor should it be 
forgotten that the British were extremely keen to establish an integrated command and control 
structure within the alliance, as this was one of the key lessons that British military planners 
had taken from the fall of France in 1940 – in the face of the German onslaught, inadequate 
joint command and control procedures between the allied powers had led to severe inabilities 
on the battle field and had hastened their defeat.14 This, therefore, indicates just how 
important the British considered the information security issue to be, as they were prepared to 
delay setting up the military alliance even in the face of what they perceived as likely conflict 
with the Soviet Union. 
Intelligence sharing 
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Since the end of the Second World War, British policy-makers sought to maintain their 
‘special relationship’ with Washington which was designed to uphold Britain’s international 
position in a world where economic difficulties had made it increasingly difficult to do so.15 
At the core of this relationship was the exchange of military and intelligence information 
between the two states.16 In particular, the dissemination of Signals Intelligence (SIGNIT) 
was the heart of this security cooperation.17 This relationship, however, was reliant upon the 
continued security of the information being shared between the two sides, and revelations 
about the extent of Soviet spies throughout democratic institutions in 1945-7, including those 
in the UK, openly challenged this security and jeopardised the relationship. Given this 
context, as well as the natural sensitivity that surrounds the collection, analysis, and sharing of 
intelligence material, it is unsurprising that the relationship with the United States was a factor 
that encouraged British officials in their thinking that the most stringent security apparatus 
was required in all of their intelligence sharing.18  Thus sensitive to the issue, a number of 
improvements to Britain’s own bureaucratic security, including the introduction of positive 
vetting of British Civil Servants, were being undertaken at this juncture.19 
Whilst the relationship with the United States was of great significance in British post-war 
thinking, the role of France was also of importance. In conjunction with the United Kingdom, 
France provided a counterweight to American and Soviet domination of European matters (at 
least in the British official mind). Moreover, France’s economic and military recovery was 
deemed as essential for containing the current Soviet threat, and the possibility of a revived 
Germany.20 With this in mind, the British saw close cooperation with France as vital for 
securing Britain’s own interests. This was all the more important, as the French government, 
despite realising its economic and military weakness, was determined to play a leading role in 
international relations and particularly in the Western alliance.21 Military cooperation with 
France was therefore seen as something which should be promoted within British policy-
making circles. Given this, bureaucratic security was to be a subject that would discussed at 
considerable length within British circles.    
Prehistory of French insecurity  
The influence of the Communist Party, its ability to win popular elections, and to attract large 
numbers of sympathisers throughout France, troubled British officials. Owing to its role in the 
wartime resistance against the German occupants, the French Communist Party (Parti 
Communiste Français, PCF) was highly popular. Given this, Britain’s Secret Intelligence 
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Service (SIS), as early as 1945, had been monitoring communists throughout France.22 The 
immediate post war period provided even greater concern for the British as the PCF’s active 
participation in government saw one of its members managing to hold the post of the air 
ministry. By the time communists were expelled from government in May 1947, the PCF had 
managed to place a large number of its sympathisers in strategic positions throughout the 
bureaucracy of the French government. Despite openly siding with the Soviet cause from 
1948 onwards, the PCF still received the largest popular vote in the 1951 elections, indicating 
continued grassroots support and genuine popular appeal.23 This was viewed with great 
scepticism across the channel and even as late as November 1948, the Observer newspaper 
felt obliged to write that based on her recent communist past ‘France is an ally on which we 
cannot count’.24 
It was within this context then that British intelligence assessments were made about France. 
In general terms, these assessed the political stability of France and the likelihood of it 
becoming a fully communist state.25 However, they were also concerned with the security of 
French institutions and the conclusions reached were extremely pessimistic. In 1948, for 
instance, one assessment concluded that Soviet agents had heavily penetrated French military 
institutions.26 Why this was of concern was simply that the international circumstances 
increased the likelihood that both Atlantic and European military cooperation would have to 
be undertaken in the near future. Thus, the internal security of potential alliance members was 
of growing importance within the official British mind.27  
This fact was evidenced as soon as discussions between British and French officials about 
military collaboration began. For instance, when the Chief of Staff of the French army, 
General Georges Revers, was due to visit the United Kingdom in early 1948, there was some 
trepidation about him receiving a candid assessment about Britain’s military position – the 
British did not want to reveal their lack of military strength which might be leaked across the 
iron curtain. On this occasion though, and largely because the British wanted to act in ‘good 
faith’ so as to ‘set the ball rolling’ for Anglo-French military cooperation, the British Chiefs 
of Staff concluded that their French counterpart should be given a full appraisal.28 At this 
point, French security did not inhibit information sharing, but crucially this was only on a 
limited, personal basis, concerning one of the highest-ranking soldiers of the Fourth Republic. 
When military co-operation was to be institutionalised through the WUDO matters began to 
change from a British point of view.  
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Western European Union 
Initially, French post-war foreign policy had been aimed primarily at preventing renewed 
German aggression. It should be recalled that French policy-makers had initially considered 
the Soviet Union a potential partner in the quest to contain future German power and had 
signed the Treaty of Franco-Soviet friendship of 10 December 1944 largely to achieve this 
ambition.29 George-Henri Soutou has characterised this policy as one of ‘neutralité’; France 
pursued its German problem single-mindedly, while in the meantime trying not to side with 
either of the slowly antagonising power blocs. The Treaty of Dunkirk between France and the 
United Kingdom of 4 March 1947 was the culmination of these French efforts – a British 
defence guarantee against Germany.30  
During the course of 1947, the international climate changed dramatically and on 12 March, 
just over a week after the Dunkirk treaty had been signed, the US-president announced his 
Truman-doctrine. In April, the Foreign Ministers’ conference in Moscow failed amidst frosty 
accusations over wartime reparations policy. In June, the US secretary of state George C. 
Marshall announced the European Recovery Programme which – once the Kremlin forbade 
their European satellites to attend – cemented the East-West divide. Finally, in February 1948, 
a communist coup toppled the Czech government, driving that country firmly behind the iron 
curtain and settling the front lines for the next forty years. Internally, too, the French situation 
had changed with the dismissal of the communist ministers from government over the issue of 
nation-wide strikes in May 1947.31  
It was within this deteriorating international environment that in March 1948, Britain, France 
and the Benelux countries concluded the Brussels Treaty. Although this treaty, too, was 
seemingly directed against Germany, it was de facto a defence treaty against the Soviet 
Union. While the Brussels Treaty powers agreed to joint defence planning, even together they 
did not possess enough military and financial resources to build up sufficient forces to 
conduct a successful defence against Soviet attack.  It was to the United States then that the 
Western European powers looked to for a defence treaty that would guarantee their security 
against the Soviet Union and strong lobbying from the likes of Ernest Bevin for a broader 
Atlantic defence alliance was a constant theme of British diplomacy throughout this period. It 
was clear then, that the future of British security within Europe would involve some type of 
integrated military organisation and this would thus involve the exchange of highly sensitive 
security information between various states.32 
 
 
8 
 
Though an alliance which included the United States was the ultimate objective of British 
policy, until this could be secured, the British and their European partners continued to press 
ahead with their integrated defence planning in the shape of the WUDO. Its tasks were to 
strengthen, coordinate and integrate all member countries’ military efforts; to study the 
strategic and tactical problems of defending Western Europe; and to provide a command 
organisation to face possible emergencies. Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery was appointed 
chairman of the Land, Naval and Air Commanders-in-Chief Committee which pitched camp 
in Fontainebleau, south of Paris. The post of Commander in Chief  for the Army fell to 
General Bernard de Lattre de Tassigny, while the naval and air forces were headed by a 
French Admiral and a British Air Chief Marshal, respectively. Overall, this command 
structure reflected that of the wartime Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, 
SHAEF.33 
Before staff talks to co-ordinate strategies could begin, however, the British were insistent 
that new security practices be established. The uncertain state of French security (which was 
by this stage an open secret) was significantly worrying the British military establishment. To 
get a clearer picture, the Chiefs instructed the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) ‘to examine 
and to report on the security aspects of Staff Talks that might be held in the future with 
France, on the strategic policy for the defence of Western European countries.’34 The findings 
of the JIC, disseminated in February 1948, were scathing.35 In the Navy for instance, no 
information except those classified as ‘très secret’ or above could be regarded as reasonably 
secure.36 Almost the same applied to the army, where nothing below ‘secret personal’ was 
considered to be kept safe. The air force came off worst. No information communicated with 
it could be presumed to be safe unless it was personally and orally provided to a selected few 
French officers believed to have been ‘secure’. The French Defence Ministry fared no better 
in the JIC’s assessment as it was noted that: ‘no information can be considered secure despite 
any security classification.’ More alarming yet was the JIC’s argument that if the French 
Minister of Defence was a communist (as had happened in the past), any planning or 
discussion by the Joint Staff Council was liable to be leaked to enemy sources. Not only that, 
any communist minister was likely to use his position to place cronies in strategically 
important staff positions which would likely leave a long-lasting legacy of impaired 
security.37 
The JIC also identified a number of reasons ‘prejudicial to security in France’. First, there was 
a ‘natural garrulous tendency in the French character which makes the temptation to pass 
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‘hot’ information, albeit in the “strictest confidence”, almost irresistible.’38 This was coupled 
with a severe lack of security-consciousness, resulting in carelessness and insufficient 
precautions to guard classified documents. Third, there was a ‘certain decline in moral 
standards in France which, together with the extremely low rates of pay, must contribute to 
the temptation to “sell” information’. All this was exacerbated by the short tenure of office of 
French ministers which not only undermined their chances of sufficiently supervising their 
ministries, but always bore the danger that the next generation of ministers was even less 
reliable than the present one.39 
Of course, it must also be noted that the JIC’s report was not entirely damning of French 
security. While the JIC believed that ‘any information passed to the French Air Force will be 
made known to Moscow’, the army and the navy had certain redeeming features. Social 
background played a role, as the majority of the army officers were considered to come from 
families not susceptible to communist propaganda. Also, the inspector general of the armed 
forces, General Bernard de Lattre de Tassigny, had introduced new training methods and 
forced the general staff to address the problem of security. In spite of these improvements to 
French security, the JIC also pointed to numerous problems. For instance, French army staff 
work was regarded as ‘notoriously bad’, not helped by inadequate security standards 
displayed in the école de guerre. The situation was better in the navy, however. The reason for 
this, the JIC believed, was a close emulation of the Royal Navy’s way of doing things. After 
all, the British system of administration and training ‘produces men who are unlikely to make 
easy subjects for Communist penetration’.40 
The JIC’s 1948 report on French security therefore contained a curious mixture of concrete 
intelligence which was based upon reports provided by the British service attachés and SIS, 
and stereotypical assumptions which were couched in barely concealed xenophobic appraisals 
of the French ‘national character’. This is noteworthy for two reasons. On the one hand did – 
and does – such stereotypical thinking potentially undermine the accuracy of intelligence 
assessments.41 As Wesley Wark and Peter Jackson have shown with regard to British and 
French intelligence assessments of Germany in the 1930s, stereotypes of Teutonic efficiency 
led to considerable over-estimates of the speed and scale of the German rearmament effort, 
which had enormous consequences for their respective foreign and defence policies.42 On the 
other hand, the use of stereotypes is indicative of considerable hubris on the British side, a 
‘can’t happen here’ attitude. This, of course, would come to haunt the British in the early 
1950s, when the first of the Cambridge Five were discovered. It is hard to imagine how 
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crestfallen the admiralty must have been, when a spy – John Vassall – was discovered in their 
midst, too.43 In the main, British assessments of French security were clearly at this stage 
extremely damning. All of the vital areas for possible military cooperation, such as the air 
force, army, navy and Ministry of Defence, were deemed to have been extremely vulnerable 
to Soviet penetration.  
Apprehension within British official circles about intelligence sharing can be appreciated 
given that the UK, as the senior partner within the WUDO and with the most productive 
intelligence and advanced scientific community, had most to lose from any information leaks 
emanating from this new military alliance. In the background was the constant concern that 
their special relationship with Washington could be damaged by some sort of security breach. 
Along with this, of particular concern for British decision makers was the release of their 
scientific estimates about weapons development. Such was their apprehension that they would 
not countenance releasing such information to their allies unless they could guarantee that 
such information would remain secret. It should be noted at this juncture that the British were 
not only concerned with French insecurity; rather, British officials were unhappy with 
security in all of the members of the WUDO, including their own!44 For example, when 
discussing the disclosure of security information to the WUDO members, the JIC warned the 
armed services about passing on information to their counterparts abroad: ‘We consider that, 
in general, Secret information should only be passed to the other countries through the 
METRIC procedure, and that it might be pointed out to the Service Ministries that, if it is not 
so handled and because of the lack of security in the other countries, it is tantamount to 
declassifying the information.’45 However, particular attention was accorded to France, not 
least as it was viewed as the most significant ally in the alliance. France, therefore, came 
under the most suspicion and scrutiny within British circles.46  
To assist with British assessments, both MI5 and SIS, on the instructions of the JIC, were to 
make contact with their partner services throughout WUDO members in an attempt to 
determine their security position more precisely.47 Clearly then, the intelligence services of 
partner countries were deemed more secure than their military institutions. Interestingly, the 
matter was not solely confined to the secret dimension. Ernest Bevin, British Foreign 
Secretary, 1945-51, had been aware of the problem for some time and took an active interest 
in French security. For instance, in 1947, Bevin warned his French counterpart, Georges 
Bidault, that ‘we can’t carry on a conversation between two Great Powers, with a third Great 
Power in the cupboard with listening apparatus’48. In a meeting with Bidault in December 
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1947, he reiterated the point and urged that ‘[s]omehow or other military talks between them 
must be begun quite soon, but in the most confidential manner’.49 Nevertheless, he was 
reluctant to do so as long as there were ‘problems with the communists in France’.50 This 
highlights that bureaucratic security concerns are not just an obscure domain to keep low-
ranking officials, historians, and social scientists busy. As Bevin was acutely aware, 
bureaucratic security had direct repercussions for his foreign policy designs.   
Bevin’s pleas were met sympathetically by Bidault who promised that the ‘situation had now 
been changed and he would guarantee only to send to London as French military 
representatives men in whom he had the fullest confidence and men whom Mr. Bevin could 
trust.’51 The man chosen was, in fact, General Revers, and the reaction of the British Chiefs to 
his appointment has been described above. Given his involvement in the creation of the 
western alliances, it was unsurprising that Bevin insisted that he be kept fully apprised when 
the matter of staff talks with France and the Benelux states began.52 
Having been given the JIC’s brief, Bevin met the French Prime Minister, Robert Schuman, as 
well as the French and Benelux foreign secretaries in a series of discussions on security 
aspects of staff talks in April 1948.53 Schuman agreed with Bevin’s proposal for a 
consultation of experts on physical security, and he proposed to expand the remit of the talks 
to include possible action against ‘suspect persons and Communist strikes’.54 The chairman of 
the JIC, Sir William Hayter, felt slightly ill at ease by the time pressure imposed to get the 
staff talks going which rendered the JIC’s preferred approach of bilateral security 
consultations impracticable. Indeed, the JIC had agreed that a cautious approach to the matter 
would be a ‘prerequisite to success with the experts on the working level.’55 In spite of the 
‘impetus given by the Foreign Secretary’ the JIC tried to gain a little more time, arguing that 
‘there would be advantage if the military aspect of staff talks with France were considered 
first.’ A Mr Fulton, probably the SIS Representative at the meeting, drew particular attention 
to the need to carefully examine French and Belgian cipher security before any actual staff 
talks began.56  
It appears then that within the British government there were divergent policy trains in 
motion. On the one hand, Bevin was seeking to push the security assessments of France 
through as quickly as possible so that cooperation could begin. Opposing this was the JIC and 
SIS, which preferred a more cautious approach be taken. This divergence in opinion is 
understandable given the respective roles of the different branches of the British government. 
What is of interest, however, is that all saw that improved bureaucratic security of potential 
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partner countries was essential before military cooperation could proceed. This, therefore, 
serves as a further example of how mundane bureaucratic matters could have larger political 
ramifications.     
As the JIC recognised, British internal security would have to account for and design new 
procedures to operate within this new level of inter-nation military collaboration.57 Of 
particular concern was the influence that communist parties had in various European states. 
The reasoning ran that if British papers on war planning, abilities, and assessments, were 
shared with the appropriate institutions in the WUDO, and, later, within NATO, these could 
be accessed by communist agents working throughout Europe and sent to Moscow.58 One of 
the biggest concerns for British policy-makers was the degree of influence that the communist 
party had in what one report dubbed a ‘certain country’. That country was – again – France.59  
The British were particularly sensitive about both the amount and the type of information that 
would have to be shared with partner countries within the framework of both the WUDO, and, 
as it came to supersede this organisation, NATO. Therefore, a new system was devised to 
overcome any of the potential problems as outlined above. This came in the guise of the 
METRIC system. METRIC was a set of procedures which had to be followed for the handling 
and transmitting of sensitive information which, in turn, would be classified according to 
normal British rules.60 The various rules devised placed a great emphasis upon bureaucratic 
procedures and the safe handling of information and were the subject of lengthy assessments 
by the JIC. The METRIC rules stipulated that all persons handling METRIC material be 
vetted; that all materials be kept in locked safes; that the material never be discussed over the 
telephone; that all METRIC related information only be discussed in secure rooms, and that 
all METRIC material be stored in locations which had security monitoring all entrances.61    
METRIC also demanded that materials classed as ‘top secret’ had to be read in London in 
designated ‘security reading rooms’. This obviously was problematic for an alliance given 
that the flow of information was being stymied by such procedures. Moreover, it provided an 
active demonstration that London simply did not trust its allies to share such information 
unless expressly under its control. This hardly augured well for alliance solidarity but it also 
meant that the timely dissemination of information, which could be crucial, was being delayed 
within the bureaucracy. 
The British were also determined that METRIC should actually be implemented and followed 
throughout the entire alliance and pushed their case forcefully with their allies. For instance, 
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having been asked by a WUDO member, the Foreign Office’s Security Department quickly 
supported the idea of inviting delegates to show the internal arrangements made by His 
Majesty’s Government to keep other countries’ secrets secret. While all JIC members agreed 
to this idea, some identified a danger associated with it: In the UK, METRIC documents were, 
in fact, given a fairly wide circulation, wider than in any of the other countries. Upon seeing 
this example, the others might decide to extend the distribution, ‘thereby increasing the 
security risk abroad.’62 
The establishment of METRIC could, in theory at least, overcome the bureaucratic security 
problems identified by the British. Nevertheless, METRIC was only going to work if it was 
actually adhered to. And on this point, the British had severe reservations that it was. In the 
following months, British insistence that METRIC be followed was causing tension in Anglo-
French relations as the French were of the opinion that bureaucratic security demands were 
being used by the British as an excuse to not share much needed intelligence.63 In spite of 
French annoyance, the JIC refused to budge. When the Air Ministry’s representative asked if 
certain documents could be forwarded to the directors of intelligence in WUDO countries, the 
JIC declined to relax the rules and decreed that such papers could only be read by METRIC-
indoctrinated officers in the London reading rooms.64  
Of particular importance from the British perspective was the issue of cipher security. As the 
events of the Second World War had demonstrated most clearly, ciphers could be broken, 
thus allowing a potential adversary access to sensitive communications and information. 
Cipher security was, however, only one part of the story. Telephonic devices in general were 
deemed insecure and such was the seriousness in which the threat of ‘leaks’ emanating from 
any form of electronic communication was viewed, the JIC had laid down extremely stringent 
regulations at the onset of the METRIC system. For example, the JIC insisted that 
‘Telephonic and Telegraphic communications will not be used for the transmission or the 
discussion of METRIC information’.65 Thus, it is not surprising then that upholding cipher 
security played an important role in the attempts to improve the overall security of France and 
similarly ‘leaky’ allies.66 From the very outset of WUDO, Mr. Fulton, (presumably) 
representing ‘C’ on the JIC, argued that ‘the cypher security of France and Belgium would 
need careful examinations before any staff talks took place.’67 Again, the issue of bureaucratic 
security was an obstacle that needed to be overcome prior to increasing military planning 
within the alliance.  
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This continued when NATO’s security measures were discussed by the JIC in late 1949. 
Indeed, cipher security was one of the few regulations of the alliance’s interim security 
measures they considered insufficient, as ‘[n]o reference is made to transmission of Top 
Secret material by telegram. Cypher security cannot be discussed within NATO, and we 
recommend that such transmission be prohibited.’68 This of course, the JIC noted, had been a 
useful interim measure adopted by WUDO, too. When the COSMIC machinery was to be set 
up from March 1950 onwards, the JIC reiterated its point of view: establishing secure 
channels of communications was – like carrying out complete, on-the-spot security checks – a 
necessary requirement before the bureaucratic security mechanism could even begin to 
work.69 
To ensure that cipher security was at a reasonable level, the JIC was eventually prepared to 
allow inspections of UK cipher rooms which had not been possible under the METRIC 
procedure. There existed a number of reasons for such an approach. First, the cipher 
transmission system set up within COSMIC was an international one, necessitating 
international controls; second, ‘[i]t would be necessary to ensure that there was no risk of 
leakage of information during the period which would elapse between the message being 
drafted and its despatch. An inspecting team would require access to cipher offices to satisfy 
themselves on this point.’70 Finally, the UK could not demand inspection of other nations’ 
cipher rooms if it denied this right to the allies. This, the JIC concluded, was ‘obviously 
undesirable if we wished to ensure that they took as strict precautions in regard to cipher 
security as we did ourselves.’71 On the surface this may have made sense but there existed one 
major argument against such an approach which was: British cipher rooms contained 
equipment far superior to the one used for COSMIC messages to which even the NATO allies 
should not be given access. If inspections were to be carried out, therefore, some sort of 
screening-off of the relevant segments of the cipher rooms would become necessary. 
In the end, despite the establishment of the METRIC procedure, along with establishing better 
cipher security, Britain still tried to reduce the flow of information to its WUDO allies. The 
core allies, France and the Benelux countries were normally not given information graded 
higher than ‘Confidential’. Only ‘in the interests of British strategic policy’ might they be 
given information up to and including ‘Top Secret’, and if so, only under the METRIC 
procedure, as this (in theory) disclosed information to only a limited number of authorized 
individuals in the Western Union countries. Other countries such as Denmark or Norway were 
given information up to and including ‘Confidential’, whilst Italy and Iceland were only given 
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information classified as ‘Restricted’, the lowest level of security.72 Perhaps even more 
crucial was that the British insisted that material classified ‘secret’ and above had to be read 
in the London reading rooms. Clearly this was an impractical way for an alliance to operate 
over any significant period of time.73 
It is apparent then that METRIC alone was insufficient for either British needs or for actually 
disseminating information throughout the alliance in the longer term. Simply put, the British 
did not believe that METRIC procedures would be employed in other capitals. Nevertheless, 
it did not actually deal with the perceived problem that communists had infiltrated the key 
state institutions of Britain’s new alliance partners. This shows then that setting strict rules is 
only one half of the story of bureaucratic security. The other part, effective enforcement of 
these rules, is just as important and can have, as this episode illustrates, considerable impact 
upon foreign policy-making. Thus, with the emergence of a bigger multi-national alliance, 
NATO, and the fact that these security problems had not dissipated, British officials went to 
task in devising a new set of bureaucratic security procedures and systems. This came in the 
form of the COSMIC system.    
Creating NATO 
The story of the deliberations that led to the signing of the Washington treaty has been 
covered exhaustively elsewhere and do not need to be retold here in detail.74 The important 
point from the perspective of this paper is the fact that when the North Atlantic Treaty was 
signed in April 1949, NATO still needed to be ‘fleshed out’. The Treaty embodied the will of 
the Western nations to enter into collective defence, but it did not lay down a detailed plan on 
how precisely the day-to-day work was to be carried out.75 As Lawrence Kaplan notes, 
NATO’s ‘elaborate infrastructure existed only on paper in NATO’s first year. There was little 
coordination among them. And it did not seem to matter. The Europeans seemingly had won 
their major objective: entangling the United States in a European alliance.’76 This may have 
been so, but in the longer term, working institutions would be required to ensure that 
operationally the new military alliance would be able to function. Again, the spectre of 
bureaucratic security came to the fore in British policy-making circles. Initially, when 
considering the problem of Atlantic Pact military organisation, the British Chiefs of Staff 
rejected any solution which involved expanding the Joint Chiefs of Staff (UK and US) by 
including the French. The reason for this was not primarily security at the beginning, but 
rather the fear that other nations would want to be included, too, rendering any organisation 
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unwieldy and threatening the ‘special relationship’ London sought to maintain with 
Washington.77 ‘Thus,’ the Chiefs wrote grudgingly, ‘we are reluctantly forced to the 
conclusion that a wider organisation would be necessary.’78 
As this was being developed, the NATO members agreed that a dual system should be 
established. This comprised the Military Committee, which was made up of military 
representatives from all member states. It was this which was to be at the heart of the military 
organisation of the Alliance. As Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary-General, put it, this 
would be NATO’s ‘supreme military authority’.79 The British were not over enamoured with 
such a system. First, the alliance was made up of some twelve states, and the idea of a 
collective military authority made up of representatives from each state would make for an 
extremely cumbersome and bureaucratic decision making body. Along with this, the British 
retained their fears that such a large body would be easily exposed to infiltration and suffer 
from leaks. The British were not alone in holding such concerns, and, consequently, the 
Standing Group was set up as a ‘three-member executive agency’.80 Staying in permanent 
session, the Standing Group was to provide strategic direction, co-ordinate and integrate 
defence plans, and ensure security of information.81 Eventually, in 1950, it was to produce 
NATO’s first security policy, DC 2/1.82  
Before all of this was achieved, the British discreetly strove hard to identify the French 
problems and implement bureaucratic security measures to help tackle this issue within the 
inner circle of NATO. Thus, in August 1949, the JIC produced a review of current procedures 
for sharing military information with NATO allies. From the start, British planners assumed a 
system parallel to METRIC would be introduced for secret and top secret information.83 In 
any case, an important factor limiting excessive distribution would be the close adherence to 
the ‘need to know’ principle. Interestingly, while at this stage, the JIC was not prepared to 
upgrade any countries to a higher security clearing, it did believe that excessive use was being 
made of the ‘secret’ category. As the JIC noted, when examined closely, ‘it will be found that 
much information now graded “Secret” ought to be downgraded.’84 This statement suggests 
then that the JIC was not an overzealous body determined to keep all and everything secret. 
Instead, their approach indicates that they realised that a workable bureaucratic security 
mechanism was required to keep the really important information safe. This would not be 
possible if the system were swamped with unimportant information. Moreover, it would 
indicate that the JIC was genuinely concerned with bureaucratic security and was not simply 
making a point of curtailing intelligence sharing for other political motives. 
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As military cooperation proceeded, the JIC produced a report in October 1949 which served 
as the blueprint for the British approach to NATO bureaucratic security.85 An important first 
step would be a detailed scrutiny of all member states’ security. This, the JIC argued, should 
be carried out in the open by the US and Britain, as they would be the key providers of 
intelligence within the alliance and had most to lose from any security breaches. Based on this 
review a conference of plenipotentiaries should decide on a method to handle secret and top 
secret information. For the first category, there clearly should be ‘a security for adoption by 
all member countries similar to the Metric procedure.’86 Along with this, a standing Security 
Subcommittee to the Standing Group should be created, manned preferably by the ‘big three’, 
that being the  US, UK and France. Even this solution, however, had a severe drawback from 
a security point of view: France. As the JIC observed: 
[t]he effect of the inclusion of France in the Standing Group will be to reduce the 
security of the group to the French level. France cannot be expected to accept 
security limitations which are not applied to the other two members of the 
Standing Group. It would clearly be desirable, if it was possible, that the highly 
classified information received by her representatives on the Standing Group 
should be confined to Washington, but if this is done, we should presumably have 
to accept the same arrangement.87 
Likewise, since the French were a member of the Standing Group, leaving them out of the 
sub-committee altogether would have constituted a severe diplomatic affront. It would also 
convey the impression that NATO was, in substance, an Anglo-American alliance. The 
solution then was to improve French security. Again, laying down rules for bureaucratic 
security – and making sure they were implemented – would be Britain’s best hope. 
To bridge the time until a security procedure was established, NATO adopted interim security 
measures.88 The JIC judged them ‘satisfactory’, which was not altogether surprising as they 
were based on the METRIC system championed by the British representatives in Brussels.89 
The only amendment desired by the British Chiefs of Staff was an additional bureaucratic 
security mechanism designed to further avoid too wide a circulation in the supposedly 
unsecure receiving countries.90 When slow decision-making at the Military Committee stalled 
the adoption even of the interim measures, the British made sure to use them on an ad hoc 
basis wherever they could. This was evidenced in the Northern European Region Defence 
Ministers meeting held on 31 October 1949, which again highlights how hard the UK worked 
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in order to get some basic security mechanisms established.91 Likewise, the JIC argued for a 
need to compartmentalise intelligence within NATO. It accepted SG’s role as a co-ordinator 
of the five NATO Regional Planning Group, but warned that circulation of their reports to all 
NATO members would ‘inevitably increase security risks.’92 
British persistence paid off and on 1 December 1949, the NATO Defence Committee adopted 
the COSMIC system as an interim security measure with detailed regulations for the security 
of information to be drawn up by the SG and implemented in the near future.93 However, 
before any formal procedure was to be adopted, the British continued to press their argument 
that all member nations; security arrangements had to meet a certain standard. France and the 
US concurred – and they asked Britain to furnish a commission ‘to make a security check of 
the security organisation, powers and standards of the member countries on behalf of the 
Standing Group.’94 
As shown then, the British had assumed the position of primary responsibility for the 
improvement of NATO’s bureaucratic security. Also, by pushing their case, the British had 
managed to convince their NATO partners that their own security service should be placed in 
charge of improving bureaucratic security. In addition, this episode also underlines the point 
that Britain was a driving force not only in the creation, but also in the ‘fitting-out’ of NATO, 
doing everything possible to turn an abstract treaty into an effective – and secure – alliance.  
Eventually, in January 1950, the Standing Group produced a paper adopted by the Defence 
Committee as DC 2/1 which was to become the backbone of NATO security. According to 
Alasdair Roberts: 
[o]ne of the main innovations of DC 2/1 was the establishment of the COSMIC 
security system. Documents flowing through the NATO apparatus were to be 
given a COSMIC marking, in addition to a security grading. The distribution of 
COSMIC documents was to be carefully managed. They were to be sent only by 
cipher machines or in accompanied bags, and sealed in double envelopes to 
prevent unauthorized inspection. Each government was to establish a central 
registry to manage the flow of COSMIC documents, as well as sub-registries in 
each department. Receipts were to be issued whenever documents changed hands 
so that the registry could trace distribution. Only personnel with COSMIC 
authorization were permitted to view COSMIC documents.95 
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COSMIC then was a thorough bureaucratic security system which was designed to radically 
overhaul the information security of the NATO alliance. It composed of several elements 
which included the employment of departmental security officers who would be responsible 
for enforcing the COSMIC procedures. They would be tasked with controlling the security 
guards employed, review the persons given access to classified material and escort any 
visitors to the various government institutions. A national COSMIC Security Committee 
would be created so as to guarantee a uniformity of enforcing the rules across the various 
government departments. Finally, governments would have to appoint a ‘National Security 
Authority’ responsible for the technical aspects of security, including the screening of 
personnel before they were informed about the COSMIC procedures.96  
In addition to the various branches of the COSMIC apparatus, further mechanisms were 
required to make the system effective. These included the thorough screening of all 
employees given access to sensitive information; the distribution of signed declarations; 
physical security means which included passports; lists of COSMIC qualified personnel; a 
sufficient amount of safes in which to store documentation; lockable rooms in which 
classified material would have to be read, and the creation of a system which could identify 
and limit leakages to the press.97 In essence, COSMIC was an improved version of METRIC 
that was designed to cope with the added burdens that the expanded NATO alliance would 
likely put upon the information sharing bureaucracy. Nevertheless, much like METRIC, the 
fact remained that the system would only work if it was actually followed. As shown below, 
the British remained deeply sceptical that this was happening. More substantively, because of 
this concern, political and military cooperation within NATO was delayed even though the 
broader international situation deteriorated and calls for such progress intensified.  
The French problem remains 
The establishment of COSMIC did not immediately remedy the basic problem perturbing 
British officials, that being, they still believed that the French state was fundamentally 
insecure. Such was the level of distrust, that in February 1950, the British Chiefs of Staff 
concluded that the existing interchange of assessments that took place between the USA, UK 
and France would have to be reassessed. Once more they confirmed their decision that the 
French should not be given the same level of information as their American counterparts. 
Moreover, all JIC assessments concerning the Soviet Union would have to be vetted before 
they were to be made available to France.98   
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It was, with regard to the Soviet Union, that the JIC seemed to detect a general lack of 
pugnacity. In a discussion concerning a study of the effect of Soviet knowledge of existing 
WUDO and NATO plans, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Eric Longley-
Cook, reminded his colleagues that ‘it would be quite fallacious to say that since the Soviet 
Union was so strong security no longer mattered.’99 An episode of May 1950 illustrates how 
much French insecurity threatened to paralyse NATO work. Having recently carried out long-
term estimates of Soviet intentions and capabilities, the American and British intelligence 
analysts realised that their appreciations were at variance with one another. JIC chairman 
Patrick Reilly argued that these differences be resolved outside the Standing Group. On the 
one hand, NATO intelligence requirements differed from US and UK ones and there was less 
need for such a study at NATO level. Perhaps more gravely ‘in view of what was known 
regarding the state of French security, it was most undesirable that any discussion of 
differences in intelligence between the United Kingdom and the United States should take 
place in front of the French in the Standing Group since this might lead to questions regarding 
raw intelligence and sources.’100  
Compounding all of this for the British was the apparent lackadaisical American attitude 
towards the issue. This had been most recently exacerbated by the American proposal to 
actually prepare intelligence appreciations in the Standing Group. Accordingly, the JIC 
decided to let their counterpart, the American JIC, know about their concerns, especially since 
one of their recent statements ‘would seem to imply that the Americans wished to be at liberty 
to disclose combined intelligence information to the French, say, which we were not allowed 
to disclose to, say, certain Commonwealth countries.’101 The same matter again occupied the 
British JIC only a week later when the Chiefs of Staff began to toy with the idea that the 
Standing Group could become a kind of NATO-Chiefs of Staff organisation. However, the 
JIC again reiterated its doubts about how continued French bureaucratic security problems 
would prevent this. As was noted, the whole role of the Standing Group ‘hinged very largely 
on this question’ of French security.102  
In response to all of this, the JIC drew up a detailed assessment of the internal security of 
what was labelled a ‘certain country’. This euphemism again referred to France. The urgency 
of the situation is underlined by the fact that because of delays in receiving the comments of 
the British ambassador to France, Sir Oliver Harvey, the JIC felt obliged to circulate a one-
page ‘interim report’. Its message was stark and clear: ‘all information passed to the French in 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation must be considered to be subject to compromise.’103 
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The JIC was determined to make its concerns known and made their reports available to the 
Chiefs of Staff on 16 June, 1950. Marked ‘limited circulation’ and ‘Guard’, the document was 
not even to be handed to the Americans in its entirety.104 From the start, its authors made it 
clear that they viewed the situation with the ‘gravest concern’. As the report outlined, the JIC 
had recently received evidence of ‘a serious lack of security’ in the French service 
ministries.105 If anything, the situation was getting worse, ‘as the scope of classified 
information being passed to the French is rapidly widening, and, in the Standing Group of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, is extending to global strategic planning and research and 
development’.106 The JIC report further explained that the French Communist Party had 
managed to establish a strong influence in all of the key ministries of state for alliance 
cooperation. These included the ministries of Air, Armaments, Industrial Production and 
Labour. Efforts to remove such persons were deemed to be ineffective in the JIC’s estimation. 
As the report suggested, in the civil service, communist influence remained ‘substantial, 
particularly in the nationalised industries.’107  
The most problematic field identified in the report was the Air Ministry. Here, communist 
penetration had been ‘cleverly accomplished, probably during the period of office of a 
previous Minister for Air, M. [Charles] Tillon, who is a Communist and no doubt used his 
opportunity to place people in important positions.’ Even his Chief of Air Staff from 1947 to 
1948, General Jean-Ludy Piollet, was ‘by no means above suspicion as a Communist.’108 
Another grave point was the failure of the French to observe the METRIC procedure. 
Following a lead from a French officer in the Western Union organisation, the JIC established 
that the Ministère de l’Air treated security grossly negligently. As they reported: 
(a) All METRIC documents do not pass through a METRIC Registry, and 
METRIC documents are sometimes being transmitted by ordinary post; 
(b) Little or no attempt has been made to indoctrinate other ranks and civilian 
clerks and draughtsmen who are handling METRIC documents; 
(c) While the majority of indoctrinated officers have read the document laying 
down the METRIC procedure, few have signed the indoctrination 
certificate.109 
Given this dramatic assessment, the JIC – in consultation with the British ambassador to 
Paris, Sir Oliver Harvey – recommended a joint Anglo-American approach. Of course this 
posed problems of its own, for, as Don Cook acutely observed, ‘[t]here is plenty of history in 
this century and longer to show that it is easy to get at cross-purposes with the French and 
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seldom easy to disentangle the snarls when they occur.’110 The JIC, too, were aware ‘that the 
French are sensitive on the point of our ganging up with the Americans’, but they hoped that 
given their predicament, they would soon come to see reason.111 Since, ultimately, the 
Americans wielded ‘the big stick’ – namely financial and military support for the Fourth 
Republic – their wishes would, of course, be taken much more seriously than a unilateral 
British approach.112 In terms of negotiating tactics, the JIC recommended an open, direct 
approach: the French should be given as much evidence as possible to show that British 
suspicions were not unfounded. Once the French accepted the necessity for better security to 
ensure a free and safe exchange of information within NATO, a joint Anglo-American 
commission should be sent to Paris to carry out detailed inspections on the ground. 
Based on attaché information, and observations made by intelligence officers at the WUDO, 
the JIC report was much more factual than its 1948 predecessor. Most obvious was the 
omission of national stereotypes that had littered previous reports as well as being designed in 
an analytical format. The report also confirmed long held suspicions within the British policy-
making bureaucracy about the level of French insecurity. Perhaps more importantly still was 
that this episode illustrates just how serious the British took bureaucratic security and that the 
subject had the potential to delay ‘high-level’ cooperation. This report was commissioned and 
presented at a time when the Joint Chiefs of Staff were proposing to create some form of an 
inter-alliance Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JIC, at least from the documentation, were not 
opposed to this. Rather, their entire concerns centred upon the lack of security within the 
French state. Accordingly, their objections to this made the Joint Chiefs reassess their plans 
and begin a concerted effort to help improve French security.    
Bureaucratic Security and Politics  
Although the establishment of METRIC and COSMIC along with the provision of secure 
cipher equipment were in essence an issue of bureaucratic security, the state of French secret-
keeping was of utmost importance for elite decision-makers, both within the government and 
the military. By the summer of 1950, the French security problem had remained unresolved 
and soon became far more than the bureaucratic nuisance it might have seemed at first sight. 
The creation of NATO was, above all, a pragmatic act, laying the foundation for a coherent 
allied defence strategy and concrete defence planning by integrated political and military 
bodies. French insecurity, therefore, threatened both of these goals. 
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In the political realm, French security influenced the way a common defence policy was to be 
deliberated, both nationally and internationally. In July 1950, Attlee and Bevin discussed a 
request by opposition-leader Winston Churchill for a debate on Western defence policy in the 
House of Commons. Churchill had offered to carry this out in a secret session, an idea 
favoured by Attlee who feared that in an open session ‘there would inevitably be an exposure 
of the weakness and lack of drive on the part of the French and our other allies which would 
do harm’.113 Bevin opposed this idea, for two reasons. The first revolved around concerns that 
such secrecy would raise suspicions in American circles. The second point was that he 
doubted a secret session would prevent the Soviets from learning what had been discussed in 
any case because the French had already been informed about what was going to be stated in 
parliament and given ‘the leaky state of France’, Bevin complained, ‘the Russians probably 
already have all the information they want.’114  
On the military side, the problem became self-perpetuating. As has been shown above, from 
the outset it had been clear that to include France in the Standing Group meant ‘to reduce the 
security of the group to the French level’.115 This, of course, made the work of the security 
sub-committee much more difficult, indeed, if not almost impossible. As Lieutenant-General 
Sir Nevil Brownjohn, Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, complained: ‘he did not see 
how these responsibilities [of the Standing Group] could be fulfilled unless the Standing 
Group were given a substantial amount of information [...]. The Joint Intelligence Committee 
however, were – with due cause – very concerned about the risk which would be involved on 
account of the present unsatisfactory state of security in France.’116 Similarly, the British 
refused to provide their French counterparts with their assessments about Soviet capabilities 
and motives.117 Thus, without the ability and confidence to exchange information, the entire 
ability of NATO to function as a credible military alliance was being seriously impaired. It 
was, at heart, the lack of confidence in the bureaucratic security of the French state that was 
causing this set of circumstances.  
Building and improving NATO’s military cooperation was soon given added emphasis as the 
outbreak of war in Korea raised fears that a global conflict with the Soviet bloc was ever more 
likely. Thus organising western defence – and doing so quickly – was deemed a paramount 
task by western policy-makers in the months after the communist invasion of South Korea in 
June 1950. Given these circumstances, the Chiefs of Staff had awaited the full JIC report on 
French security and took hold of it on 21 July, 1950.118 They immediately forwarded the 
document to the Minister of Defence and to the Foreign Secretary, and instructed the JIC to 
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prepare a brief based on the report to prepare him for the meeting with his French counterpart, 
René Pleven.119 Bevin himself was regularly informed about the state of French security, and 
he received the JIC-report on ‘security in a certain country’ in mid-July – the urgency with 
which Bevin then treated the problem is evident from the fact that he gave a detailed reply the 
very same day he received the report.120  
Bevin believed that the report showed ‘a most serious state of affairs’ and proposed to discuss 
the issue with the Americans first, before engaging the French in tripartite talks to finally 
resolve the problem.121 Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador to Washington, and Lord 
Tedder, Chairman of the Joint Services Mission, suggested preliminary talks with their 
American counterparts before establishing another tripartite body. It was their idea to create a 
working group that would provide some concrete solutions to the security problem. In spite of 
this urgency, the diplomatic machinery moved sluggishly, and in mid-August, before a 
meeting with his American and French colleagues, Bevin was briefed that the Chiefs of Staff 
have recently expressed their unwillingness to discuss world strategy with the French while 
their security remained so bad. As Bevin’s briefs concluded: ‘it is likely to be weeks, or even 
months, before we can be sure of any improvement in French security.’122 
How to improve the situation? 
What becomes abundantly clear when studying the documentary record is that the British 
military seemed especially unhappy about letting their French colleagues know their secrets. 
It is also apparent that the British only regarded the United States as a trustworthy foreign 
power. Perhaps this is understandable given the close ties established between the two 
countries during World War II where they had cooperated to the extent that joint Anglo-
American joint chiefs of staff had been created.123 What is also clear, however, is that the 
military were determined to ensure NATO would be organised and ran via a joint Anglo-
American framework as much as possible. As they argued in one report on the ‘Atlantic Pact 
Military Organisation’ in March 1949: ‘[T]he United States and United Kingdom 
representatives in consultation will have to be firm in restricting, as far as possible, the 
discussions in the Atlantic Pact Chiefs of Staff Committee of their detailed plans.’124  
Certainly, as shown above, bureaucratic security issues in other states were influencing this 
opinion. In addition to this, these reservations are also indicative of Britain’s pragmatic 
determination to turn NATO into a functioning alliance which they believed would be 
hampered if all military planning was conducted on too large a scale. Only bureaucratic 
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security then seemed to be a way out of this unwelcome situation. The problem was as much 
about adopting a NATO-wide security procedure as it was about making sure it was applied. 
Better control, or supervision, seemed to be the most obvious solution and this was duly 
proposed by the Chairman of the UK delegation to the Brussels Treaty Military Committee in 
July 1950 where he suggested that the existing METRIC controls should be 
internationalised.125 This failed to convince the JIC however. As they argued, the existing 
checks were useful only to verify if the METRIC registries were in order or to see that all 
personnel were METRIC-cleared. As they further explained:  
If this is so, we are of the opinion that the proposed checks will achieve little more 
than to ensure the routine implementation of the Metric system. This, of course, is 
desirable from a security point of view and we are therefore in favour of such 
checks from the strictly security point of view, but we would point out that they 
may cause a certain amount of irritation and friction and result in window-
dressing for the purpose of the checks.126 
This ‘window-dressing’ would reduce much of the effects of checks to do away with the 
deep-rooted insecurity issues: 
We would also point out that such checks will not necessarily ensure the 
reliability of persons handling Metric documents, nor will they discover organised 
sources of leakage through Communist penetration. Too much reliance should not 
therefore be placed on them as a means of tightening up security in the countries 
concerned, particularly in France.127 
What was needed then was a thorough inspection of the French departments which would be 
followed by a scrupulous overhauling of the entire security procedures within France to 
ensure that bureaucratic security was adhered to.  
This practical approach to improving French security (though of course from a French 
perspective could legitimately be interpreted as being highly intrusive!) continued to concern 
the JIC throughout the rest of 1950. Thus, in October of that year, the JIC again advised the 
British government that it had to demonstrate to their French colleagues how to practically 
improve their security. The JIC was of the belief that the United States could be useful in 
achieving this and suggested that American officials invite their French counterparts to visit 
the Pentagon to see how to properly run their security.128 Interestingly, the JIC did not 
propose that the French be invited to survey British security procedures!  
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As 1950 approached its end then, British security officials continued in their quest to improve 
French bureaucratic security and were now prepared to push the issue more forcefully with 
their French colleagues. Such was their determination that the British concluded that if the 
Americans refused to raise the issue of French security, then they themselves would do so.129 
All of these efforts, however, appeared to have achieved very little in the opinion of the 
British. As the JIC noted at the end of the year, ‘security in the French Government Machine, 
and particularly in the French Service Departments, is extremely bad.’130 The Minister of 
Defence, Emanuel ‘Manny’ Shinwell, and the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, shared such 
negative assessments.131  
Sharing intelligence with France 
The French Foreign Minister, Pleven, had declared in the summer of 1950 that intelligence 
sharing within the NATO alliance would have to be undertaken with the strictest of 
reciprocity. To no small degree, this had been caused by the obvious British reluctance to part 
with their intelligence.132 Intelligence sharing within the newly created alliance system was 
certainly undertaken in a difficult, disjointed, and haphazard manner at this stage. For some 
time, the British Service Attachés based in Paris had experienced difficulties in obtaining 
information, with them often being told to make use of the Brussels Treaty machinery and the 
METRIC system. MI5 was not altogether unhappy with this proposal. After all, its 
representative, J. L. Irvine, argued the French had admitted that they were unable to vet 
everyone who had access to classified information and this was one of the reasons for the 
creation of the METRIC mechanism.133  
The other JIC members were sceptical about this, and, moreover, genuinely wished for a more 
secure system so as to ensure the smooth functioning of the alliance. The JIC acknowledged 
that METRIC and COSMIC were slightly more secure than the Attaché system, but the 
system should be retained given that much valuable information would be lost if the attachés 
were suddenly cut off from the painstakingly established contacts in their host country. 
Perhaps even more important was the practicality of the situation. The METRIC system, if 
having to deal with the amounts of information to be expected if all traffic was run through it, 
would likely to be quickly overburdened and be thus crippled as an effective means of 
intelligence distribution. Captain John Litchfield, the DNI’s representative, was most 
outspoken against the scheme. First, METRIC had been designed only for highest-level 
intelligence for joint policy and planning matters. Second, given the constraints of the 
METRIC system, information which had once passed through it were only to be seen by the 
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few METRIC-cleared personnel and could not be widely disseminated. This would 
considerably reduce the use of such information within the context of a military alliance. 
Finally, he doubted that the plan would actually improve security, noting that: ‘The problem 
of French security had to be cleared up and if the French could not be persuaded to institute a 
purge system and get rid of communists in Government Departments, a high policy decision 
would have to be made as to whether we should continue to pass highly classified information 
to the French.’134 Once again, the spectre of cutting off the intelligence flow due to French 
insecurity loomed ominously. And, when, soon after this, the Directors of Plans considered 
the implications of French insecurity on planning, they warned that passing on any technical 
information would be ‘most undesirable’.135  
Again then, the British decided that an effort in conjunction with the United States at the 
highest level had to be made to improve French internal security. How this should be 
undertaken caused some debate within British policy-making circles. The Foreign Office, 
along with the Colonial Office, warned that any approach to the French had the potential to 
undermine the confidence built up in Anglo-French relations throughout the past two to three 
years.136 This advice appears not to have bothered Ernest Bevin all that much, who, at this 
point, had taken up the task of improving French bureaucratic security with vigour. Whilst he 
was hardly insensitive to broader Anglo-French relations, Bevin had decided the improvement 
of bureaucratic security within the French state should be accorded top priority. He had 
decided that a two pronged approach which would bring both British and US pressure upon 
the French should be taken. The first objective was to obtain American support for this plan 
and thus the British Ambassador to Washington, Oliver Franks, was ordered to address the 
State Department about the perilous position of French bureaucratic security. Lord Tedder, 
the Chief of the Air Staff, was instructed to approach the American Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
press the message home.137 Manny Shinwell, the British Minister of State for Defence, was 
then instructed to raise bureaucratic security with Pleven himself ‘in very general terms’.138  
Bevin’s plan appears not to have worked out in the fashion he had wanted. Whilst the 
Americans welcomed the British proposals about improving French bureaucratic security, 
they were not prepared to raise the matter with the French either directly, or in the form of a 
joint Anglo-American approach. Rather, they wanted the French to bring the matter up for 
discussion, and then they would offer their advice.139 For the Americans then, the issue of 
bureaucratic security was simply not worth pursuing at a juncture when broader international 
circumstances dictated western cooperation. The British, however, refused to yield. Indeed, 
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all was not lost for Bevin for the Americans had mentioned that a French proposal about the 
creation of a special group to facilitate the exchange of information on weapons development 
could be exploited for improving French bureaucratic security. As the Americans suggested, 
if this special group was to be countenanced, then the Americans could insist that the French 
create a new working group which would be exclusively attached to the French President’s 
office. Thus, the people employed here would be vetted and cleared to work on sensitive 
matters.140     
The British were not entirely taken in by this and did not believe that such measures were 
sufficient on their own to actually tackle the problem of French bureaucratic insecurity. In the 
opinion of the Foreign Office it was:  
useful as a first step, but [...] it did not go nearly far enough. What we needed to 
find out was the steps the French were taking to improve security throughout their 
Government machine, particularly as regards the reliability of personnel in the 
Service Departments, so that we could be satisfied that all the information they 
got, most of which could not be confined to a small group such as that proposed 
by M. Moch[.]141 
The problem from the British perspective then was that the Americans seemed to have 
proposed a slow-working permanent organisation whereas they desired an ‘ad hoc body for a 
special enquiry’.142 Again then we can see that it was the British government that was the 
leading force for establishing more vigorous and far reaching institutional reforms. Frustrating 
their cause was a mixture of American and French apathy towards the subject.  
One month later, the situation in the opinion of the British government had still not improved.  
On the contrary, things appeared to have deteriorated further. As Bevin’s earlier scheme came 
unstuck, the Americans responded by suggesting that a US-UK working group should be 
created to discuss bureaucratic security. This only exasperated the British further who wanted 
to resolve the issue and believed that working groups would only postpone genuine reform. 
One briefing paper for Bevin captures this well when it laments: ‘[w]e do not want to set up 
another circumscribed group on the lines of the COSMIC system but to improve French 
security as a whole.’143  
Consequently the British lobbied the Americans to accept the need to fundamentally address 
the problem of bureaucratic security. This they appeared to have succeeded in as the FO 
managed to convince their American colleagues to have preliminary bilateral talks about 
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NATO’s entire bureaucratic security. The delegations were to be composed of security 
experts, including SIS and MI5 representatives, and once some sort of agreements had been 
found, France would be invited to join the talks.144 The new working group was to meet in 
Washington before relocating to France in order to show the French how US Departments 
were properly secured.145 When briefing Bevin and Shinwell, the JIC underlined the point that 
the American proposal to study the three countries’ ministries of defence was not enough. In 
their talks, the ministers should argue for an extension of the investigation to ‘make as 
comprehensive an enquiry as possible throughout the French Government’.146  
Once again then, American support for British plans had not gone as far as the British would 
have had hoped, but at the very least it had begun the process of addressing French 
bureaucratic security. This limited support, however, appears not to have placated the British, 
and by December 1950, the British had reached the end of their patience. In their estimation 
the process of establishing secure bureaucracies in which information could be shared was far 
too slow. Therefore, the upcoming London NATO conference was to be used as a forum 
where the subject of bureaucratic security could be confronted head on.  
The British, in what appeared to be a recurring theme, decided they again needed American 
support and decided to utilise the tripartite working group forum to discuss the matter. As the 
British intelligence services suggested, if the American secretary of state, Dean Acheson, did 
not raise the subject in this forum, then they ‘should remind him about it’ privately.147 To 
reiterate the point, the JIC again informed Shinwell about the parlous state of French 
security.148 While the JIC still considered it ‘rather absurd’ to have talks on French security 
‘on the other side of the Atlantic’, they were prepared to send a delegation there as it offered 
an opportunity to win American support and could potentially speed along the process of 
bureaucratic security reforms.149  
Such optimistic thinking was misplaced given the time it took for this tripartite group to find 
an agreed strategy for tackling French bureaucratic security. In the end, the group did agree 
that a major inquiry into the state of bureaucratic security in all of their respective capitals 
should be undertaken. However, as the British made known privately, they only agreed to 
reexamine their own bureaucratic security procedures because it would provide them with the 
‘covert purpose of discovering in particular the state of security in France’.150 It should be 
noted then that reciprocity in bureaucratic security inspections was a path the British were 
willing to pursue all in order to improve the state of bureaucratic security within France. 
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The work of the tripartite group was concluded on 6 June, 1951, after the last inspections in 
Paris were finished. It should be recognized that the British were granted considerable access 
to various French institutions which included not only civil ministries but areas of French 
industry also. In spite of this, many elements within the British intelligence and military 
services remained unsatisfied and a special report by the British delegation to the Chiefs of 
Staff remained critical of the current state of French security. The JIC, which drew heavily 
upon this report, concluded that French bureaucratic security remained less than secure and 
consequently meant that the establishment of closer military and intelligence ties had to be 
delayed. As they concluded: ‘the flow of classified information to France should not be 
generally increased at any rate for the time being, and that all highly classified information 
which it is proposed to pass to the French, either direct or through NATO machinery, should 
be carefully reviewed in the light of the security risk involved.’151  
What then was still causing apprehension amongst British intelligence chiefs? Simply put, it 
was the inconsistency of the French in actually implementing the procedures that they said 
they were following. Along with this, the purging of ‘undesirable personnel’ throughout the 
French bureaucracy was encountering a number of legal difficulties which meant that 
suspected and known communists remained within their posts. Likewise, the efficiency of 
screening personnel was considered ‘doubtful’, being patchily organized, and based upon 
inadequate records. On a positive note, the British delegation had explicitly lauded the drive 
and determination of Defence Minister Jules Moch, the Defence Ministry’s Permanent Under-
Secretary, Mons, and the Director General of the Sûreté Nationale, Robert Hirsch. Overall, 
the report raised considerable hopes that the situation would soon improve: 
By and large the present state of French security cannot be regarded as altogether 
satisfactory; indeed, in places it may be said to be well-nigh non-existent. 
Nevertheless, considering the appalling difficulties, a very great deal has been 
accomplished in a relatively short time and satisfactory results have been obtained 
even if the methods employed are somewhat unorthodox according to British 
standards. The important thing is that there is an evident determination at the top 
to set matters right. If the co-operative attitude displayed by the French Security 
Working Group is any guide, every effort will be made, subject of course, to the 
complexion of the new French Government, to “stop the gaps”.152 
The JIC, perhaps remembering the long and painful story of French insecurity which had kept 
it busy for almost three years at this stage, was slightly less optimistic: 
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The French authorities with whom the British team were in contact have shown 
that they really want to improve their security and, appear to have a sincere 
determination to eliminate all Communists from the administration as 
opportunities occur. On the other hand it could not be ascertained to what degree 
this determination permeated through all Ministries or among the politicians.153 
 
Aftermath and conclusions 
In spite of these latest developments, British suspicion about French bureaucratic insecurity 
persisted throughout the 1950s.154 Their being allowed access to the French bureaucracy did 
not fully sooth their fears, nor did the creation of new security procedures such as METRIC or 
COSMIC. Ultimately then, what continued to cause apprehension for the British was the fact 
that the establishment of new security procedures did not actually mean that they would ever 
be followed.155 Moreover, a simpler conclusion emerges: the British simply remained 
distrustful of their French ally. Nevertheless, towards the end of this episode, the French had 
at least shown themselves to be willing to improve the situation, and had even allowed Anglo-
American inspections of their bureaucracy in order to temper British concerns. This, along 
with the hope that the situation might have finally improved, seems to have led to the British 
to conclude that whilst French security remained doubtful and only carefully selected 
information should be given to French contacts, the improvements in their security practices 
meant that the British could no longer object to joint planning and general information sharing 
within the NATO context because of bureaucratic security concerns.156 
Of course, the irony in the British position must be noted at this juncture. Whilst constantly 
complaining about the possibility of Soviet penetration of the French state, the British 
themselves had been compromised. At the Pentagon Talks for instance, the French had been 
excluded because of their perceived insecurity yet in the British delegation was one Donald 
Maclean, who had been working for the KGB since 1936!157 Certainly one can make the 
observation then that the British security services would have been better placed to have 
looked at the problems within their own bureaucracies before advancing their case too 
strongly with foreign powers.  
This point, however, should not be pushed too far for a number of reasons. The first is that the 
British were concerned with their own internal security practices and did throughout this 
period undertake a number of improvements to their own bureaucratic security procedures.158 
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Second, the fact remains that British concerns about French bureaucratic insecurity were not 
being engineered to create Anglo-French tension, nor were they ‘imagined’ to ensure the 
Anglo-American special relationship would remain exclusive and not be compromised or 
undermined by the establishment of NATO. Genuinely the British did fear that the creation of 
this multinational military alliance could seriously compromise their own security via 
communist penetration or leaks. In this they were not wrong given that Soviet agents had 
managed to penetrate large parts of the French government, including its foreign intelligence 
service, the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage, SDECE.159 This, 
and the irony of the British efforts is best summarised in a judgment made by Christopher 
Andrew: It was, Andrew wrote ‘[a]fter the compromise of the British Magnificent Five in 
1951, [that] France became for the remainder of the decade the KGB’s most productive 
source of intelligence on Western policy to the Soviet Bloc.’160 So the British were right – 
French security was far from good and likely to be exploited by the Soviets. However, until 
the British spies were unearthed in the early 1950s, the French problem was far smaller than 
the UK’s very own. 
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